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This article aims to examine the nature of Japanese government?s trade policy in the current climate 
of economic downturn after the tsunami disaster of March 2011. Consistent with its earlier policies pro-
moting regional economic integration, the Japanese government has actively and strategically been pur-
suing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with its trade partners. Recently, however, Tokyo also an-
nounced its interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiation. Since the 
agreement requires complete elimination of tariﬀs including those applicable to agricultural products 
which are highly protected in the country, the Japanese government had been ?not ready yet? to enter the 
grouping. However, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda publicly announced Japan?s interests in joining TPP 
negotiation at the APEC Summit in Honolulu in 2011. Given the circumstances, several questions arise: 
Why has Japan been pursuing regional trade strategies centered on the FTA/TPP instead of relying solely 
on bilateral FTAs? What are the factors that promote or hinder Japanese participation in the TPP? How 
will the likely development of the TPP change the contours of regional cooperation in the near future?  
In what follows, I address these questions and make suggestions regarding the Japanese government?s 
trade policy to cope with the economic downturn after the tsunami disaster of March 2011.
Key words: TPP, agricultural subgovernment, FTAAP
1.?Introduction
In August 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained a majority in the lower house, resulting 
in the first prime minister from the DPJ in postwar history. With much fanfare in Japan, the DPJ ad-
ministration launched a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party and the People?s New 
Party. Needless to say, this was a regime change of historical significance in Japan?s party politics. 
However, with a succession of leaders, it failed to keep its mandate and lost public support, leading to 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)?s victory?earning 294 seats out of 480 in total in the general elec-
tion for the Japanese House of Representatives held in December 2012. As a result, the LDP returned 
to power in Japan?s party politics. LDP leader Shinzo Abe came back, getting a second chance after his 
failure as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. Abe promises harsh reforms to achieve a goal of ?making 
a strong Japan.? In the midst of such political transformation, among the contested issues in Japanese 
politics, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),1 the multilateral high-level free trade agree-
ment (FTA), is one of the most essential topics. Whether Japan should participate in the TPP negotia-
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tions has been a key issue in how to revitalize the economy. How will the LDP?s comeback to power af-
fect future trajectories of the TPP?
Regarding FTAs, since the 1990s, the number of bilateral or regional FTAs that have been signed has 
increased dramatically. In the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, countries such as the United States, 
Canada, Mexico, and Chile have pursued FTAs as one of their trade policy options since the early 
1990s. Dent (2003, 2) has called the sudden proliferation of regional bilateral FTAs ?one of the most 
important recent developments in the Asia-Pacific regional political economy.? Baldwin (1995) points 
to the existence of a ?domino eﬀect? from the second to the early third wave of FTA creation. Similarly, 
Mansfield and Milner (1997, 1999) identify a ?contagion eﬀect.? While the number of FTA agreements 
has also surged on a global level since the early 1990s, the rapid increase in FTAs in the Asia-Pacific is 
particularly noteworthy given the relative dearth of such arrangements in the region before the 1990s.
Despite the diﬀusion of FTAs, the East Asian region was for the most part characterized by a near 
absence of formal FTAs and regional institutions. However, currently East Asian countries are pursu-
ing greater formal economic institutionalization, linking existing bilateral and minilateral FTAs and 
creating new ones as well. The ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) has held regular meetings, 
and the East Asia Summit (EAS) brings together an additional three countries?India, Australia, and 
New Zealand?with the United States and Russia joining the summit in 2011.
In particular, among East Asian countries, Japan pursued a single-track approach for almost fifty 
years, focusing its trade negotiation eﬀorts exclusively on the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which emphasized multilateral trade liberalization based on the most favored nation principle and 
shunned regionalism as harmful to the GATT/WTO2 system. However, the Japanese government to-
day is also aggressively promoting FTAs with its trade partners. Currently, Japan has put a total of thir-
teen FTAs into eﬀect?twelve bilateral FTAs with partner countries, and one regional FTA with ASE-
AN?and is carrying out negotiations for FTAs with five more countries (see Figure 1). FTAs represent 
a policy of preferential trade agreements between specific countries aimed at eliminating tariﬀ and 
nontariﬀ barriers, contrary to the most favored nation treatment that is the basic principle of the 
WTO. With this in mind, Japan?s active and sustained engagement in FTAs in recent years can be in-
terpreted as a significant shift in its trade policy (Urata 2011; Kim 2008).
Furthermore, the Japanese government also recently announced its interest in joining the TPP nego-
tiations. Because the agreement requires complete elimination of tariﬀs, including those applicable to 
agricultural products, which are highly protected in the country, the Japanese government had been 
?not ready yet? to enter the grouping. However, Yoshihiko Noda publicly announced Japan?s interests 
1 The TPP is unlikely to be the defining issue for many Japanese voters. According to NHK News 7 on November 26, 31 percent 
of voters are in favor of Japan participating in the TPP, 16 percent are against, and 44 percent do not hold a strong view either 
way. Voters rate other issues as far more important, including the economy, social security, and nuclear power.
2 Regional trade agreements (RTAs), which violate one of the GATT/WTO?s basic principles of nondiscrimination, are permit-
ted under GATT Article XXIV with several conditions. That includes liberalization of substantially all the trade of the mem-
bers, not increasing trade barriers on nonmembers, and completing the RTA process within ten years.
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in joining TPP negotiations at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Honolulu in 
2011. Currently, the new LDP administration is opposed to joining the TPP negotiations as long as 
they are premised on tariﬀ abolition without exceptions, while Abe has once claimed that the ?LDP has 
suﬃcient negotiating power to break through tariﬀ abolition without exceptions,? implying the possi-
bility of joining in the negotiations. Despite this controversial situation, it seems that the TPP debate 
dominates the center of Japanese politics and will go on.
Given the circumstances, several questions arise: Why has Japan been pursuing regional trade strat-
egies centered on the FTA/TPP instead of relying solely on bilateral FTAs? What are the factors that 
promote or hinder Japanese participation in the TPP? How will the likely development of the TPP 
change the contours of regional cooperation in the near future? In what follows, I address these ques-
tions and make suggestions regarding the Japanese government?s trade policy to cope with the eco-
nomic downturn after the tsunami disaster of March 2011.
2.?The TPP and Japan
What then is the TPP? The TPP is perceived as a ?great historical transformation as much as import-
ant as an industrial revolution and Renaissance.? From a historical perspective, it is also perceived as 
taking the Asia-Pacific region ?beyond the end of cold war.3? It is a comprehensive agreement known 
as a high-standard ?21st-century trade agreement,? which attempts to promote trade liberalization, in-
cluding the elimination of tariﬀs and expansion of service trades beyond the existing framework of the 
Figure 1?Japanese Current FTAs
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WTO. The TPP member states are aiming to establish new rules for service trade, investment, compe-
tition, government procurement, intellectual property, and labor. Regarding trade, it sets principles to 
abolish immediate or gradual abolition of tariﬀs on all items including agricultural products within ten 
years. Thus it aims to advance the process of multilateralizing the ?noodle bowl? of bilateral RTAs in 
the Asia-Pacific region and it will be open to future accessions.
The TPP is currently being negotiated by eleven countries at diﬀerent stages of development from 
four diﬀerent continents in the Asia-Pacific region. Originally, the TPP came into eﬀect in 2006 with 
four relatively small countries: Singapore, Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand. The United States did not 
promote trade liberalization within the APEC framework in the late 1990s but began to advance a Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) under the auspices of APEC in 2005. After the United States 
decided to participate in the TPP in 2009,4 Australia, Peru, and Vietnam committed themselves to join 
the TPP, followed by Malaysia, Mexico and Canada. Given that the current members and those that 
are participating in the negotiations are small economies except for the United States, it is widely be-
lieved that the TPP will become a de facto FTA between Japan and the United States if Japan becomes 
a member.5
Until recently, the Japanese government had not paid much attention to the TPP but focused instead 
on bilateral FTA activities in parallel with its policy for Asian economic integration.6 The Japanese gov-
ernment has long been an advocate of regionalism. For instance, in 2002, Junichiro Koizumi gave a 
policy speech in Singapore titled ?Japan and ASEAN in East Asia,? expressing his vision of a ?commu-
nity that acts together and advances together.? Yukio Hatoyama also advocated an ?East Asian Com-
munity? that is based upon an East Asian FTA. In 2006, Japan proposed and promoted strongly a 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA: ASEAN+6 FTA).7 CEPEA is an econom-
ic integration proposal that considers trade liberalization and economic cooperation as the two pillars, 
and also ASEAN as the center or hub (METI 2011). The Japanese government regards the CEPEA as 
not contradictory to the TPP and as being organically connected with the TPP as a building block of 
the FTAAP.8
On October 1, 2010, in his policy platform delivered to the Japanese Diet, Naoto Kan indicated the 
3 Nihon Keiszai Shimbun, December 27, 2010.
4 In the case of the United States, President Barack Obama decided to participate in the TPP to expand its products export and 
job creation. Kirik, Rosnald (2009), Speech at United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, Executive Oﬃce 
of the President (Oﬃce of the US Trade Representative), December 14.
5 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 10, 2010.
6 According to Trade White Paper 2001, the Japanese government noted clearly it would adopt an FTA strategy instead of the 
WTO?s multilateral trade liberalization and mentioned ?FTA/EPA is one form of regional integration.?
7 The idea of CEPEA is rather diﬀerent from the former organization in the aspect of the range to be covered and the areas to be 
enlarged. The original range of ?East Asian community? was ASEAN and East Asian countries, that is, Japan, China, and 
South Korea. This concept is regarded as a narrow East Asian community. However, the new idea of CEPEA includes Oceanic 
countries of Australia and New Zealand and the South Asian country of India besides ASEAN+3. It can be regarded as a wid-
er or ?expanded concept of ?East Asian Community.?
8 Interview with Professor Shujiro Urata, Waseda University, September 7, 2012.
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government?s intention to participate in the TPP as the pathway to build an FTAAP, which is a goal of 
the APEC, for the first time.9 Furthermore, one week later in a New Growth Strategy Conference he 
indicated that the ?EPA/FTA is significant to make a condition to share the growth and prosperity with 
Asia-Pacific nations such as US, South Korea, China, and ASEAN. As part of this, we are going to con-
sider the participation in TPP and will decide the main principle of Japanese FTA aiming the achieve-
ment of FTAAP, until the APEC Summit.?
However, on March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake struck the Tohoku area, leading to a 
calamitous meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The World Bank estimated direct and in-
direct economic losses at $235 billion, the most expensive natural disaster in Japanese history. Numer-
ous private relief eﬀorts were quickly launched and the government announced its own relief plan 
costing 23 trillion yen or more over the ten-year reconstruction period. In order to cope with the acci-
dent at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) sent 
many TPP-related oﬃcials to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, including Hidehiko Nishiya-
ma, deputy director-general for international trade policy.10 Due to this tragic disaster, the government 
had postponed its discussion of participation in the TPP negotiation.
Succeeding Kan as prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda publicly and dramatically announced Japan?s in-
terests in joining TPP negotiations at the APEC Summit in Honolulu on November 11, 2011. His deci-
sion was made possible by the institutional change from isolation of bureaucrats from the policymak-
ing process toward cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats. Noda also resumed the meeting 
of administrative vice-ministers, which had been abolished in the former administration. In particular, 
he appointed Seiji Maehara as chair of the Policy Research Council and established the new project 
team (PT) for promoting the TPP, which set Yoshio Hachiro, former minister of METI, as chair. Under 
the Noda administration, the pro-TPP politicians, such as former minister of foreign aﬀairs Katsuya 
Okada and DPJ Secretary General Azuma Koshiishi, played an important role in supporting Noda?s 
decision to join TPP negotiations.11
3.?The Background of Japan?s TPP Proposal
Despite the significance of the TPP, the Japanese government has been unable to even start the nego-
tiation process. The reason, I argue, is that the Japanese government could not come up with an appro-
priate policy in the face of strong opposition from the agriculture sector in Japan.
Kan likened the TPP to ?the third kaikoku (opening of Japan to the world), following the Meiji Res-
9 Prime Minister Cabinet 2010, ??As part of this, we will look into participating in such negotiations as those for the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership agreement and will aim to build a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. With a view toward making the East 
Asian Community a reality, I want to open our country to the outside world and move forward with concrete steps of negotia-
tions as much as possible.??Policy Speech delivered by Kan at the 176th Extraordinary Session of the Diet,? http://www.kantei.
go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201010/01syosin_e.html
10 Nikkei Shimbun, March 23, 2011.
11 Interview with DPJ politician, PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012.
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toration of 1868 and defeat in World War II.?12 For the Japanese government, the significance of the 
TPP is to participate in building the economic order of Asia-Pacific under the new international envi-
ronment, such as the economic and military emergence of China, the United States? return to Asia, 
and Japan?s lowered presence. This means that it will create an opening toward an FTA with the United 
States, for the purpose of responding to the request of Japan?s export industry to catch up with South 
Korea?s ?simultaneous FTA strategy.? In other words, to solve the Japanese economy?s problem, which 
has been referred to as the ?lost 20 years,? the TPP was regarded as an opportunity for new demand 
and job creation, and as a growth-stimulating policy. Therefore, participation in the TPP means an ac-
tive FTA strategy to develop the Japanese economy13 by incorporating the high growth of the Asia- 
Pacific and maintaining the Japanese industry?s global competitiveness.
Kan?s speech on the ?TPP consideration? was driven by three main reasons. The first is the Japan-US 
relations factor. The United States has consistently demanded that Japan open its agricultural market 
(Urata 2011, 102). At the same time, both sides attempted to strengthen the Japan?US alliance by fix-
ing the earlier discord between Japan and the United States (Kimura 2011; Terada 2011). The Hatoya-
ma administration had put an emphasis on Japan?China relations and asserted the desirability of an 
East Asian Community. Moreover, the harshly contested Okinawa Futenma issue between Japan and 
the United States led to the worsening of the bilateral relationship. As Defense Secretary Akihisa Na-
gasima said, ?Since the U.S. has an idea that they don?t have to keep Japan?US bilateral alliance any-
more, Japan should make an eﬀort to keep it.? The TPP was understood as one policy option to pro-
mote US engagement in the Japan?US alliance relationship through Japan?US market integration. For 
example, some Japanese media reported that the conclusion of the TPP would strengthen Japan?US 
relations and reduce Chinese power in Asia.14
Second, there was a business group request trying to expand their export market as a response to the 
US request. Since many countries of Asia-Pacific, including the United States, who had not participat-
ed in the FTA proposal are participating in the TPP, and aiming for high-level trade liberalization, the 
TPP rule has been highly considered as a possible de facto regulatory institution in the Asia-Pacific 
(Umada 2011; Watanabe 2012; Ishikawa 2011). Keidanren has pointed out the significance of 
rule-making and urged early on that Japan join the TPP. Given the recognition that Japanese participa-
tion is inevitable, Keidanren asserts the need of Japan?s early participation, saying, ?Even if Japan final-
ly participates in TPP in the future, the rule has been already set up, and it urges Japan to passively ac-
cept it without its consent. Japan should lead a rule-making of Asia-Pacific region, and make a 
contribution to regional economic growth and job creation? (Keidanren 2011).
The third factor is South Korea. The South Korean government concluded its FTA negotiation with 
12 Ashahi Shimbun, October 15, 2010.
13 According to the Cabinet Oﬃce, regarding the macro eﬀect of the TPP in Japan, it is estimated that the minus eﬀect would oc-
cur on the domestic production of Japanese-sensitive sector, while the plus eﬀect of other sectors would surpass it. It also esti-
mates the increase of Japanese substantial GDP at 1.23 percent?1.62 percent (?6.1?8.0 trillion yen).
14 Nikkei Weekly, November 15, 2010.
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the United States in 2007, signed with the EU in 2010, and declared the start of its FTA negotiation 
with China. Given this situation, it is apparent that South Korea is actively promoting its FTAs with the 
United States, EU, and China, the three main export markets for Japan. To the Japanese government, 
already fearful of its being left out of the FTA competition in East Asia, South Korea?s recent push to-
ward FTAs heightened the sense of crisis about Japan?s economic and diplomatic disadvantage (Okuda 
2010; Kim 2011).15 It is worth noting that at the first conference of the Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (EPA) project team, Yoshio Hachio, the former minister of METI, touched upon ?South Korea? 
and expressed his worries about Japan?s falling behind Korea, saying that Japan was facing a turning 
point in dealing with the TPP substantially because the U.S. Congress ratified the KORUS FTA (Kim 
2012).16
4.?The Strong Agricultural ?Subgovernment? as a Barrier to the TPP
On the other hand, strong domestic opposition exists against TPP participation, especially from the 
agriculture sector. The first indicator of strong interest-group mobilization is the existence of informal 
political meetings called the ?Meeting for Careful Consideration of TPP.? This group was initiated by 
about 140 members, one-third of DPJ politicians, and supported by JA-Zenchu. It held meetings with 
agriculture groups opposing the FTA and hosted lectures by anti-FTA scholars. The TPP was touted as 
a big problem that might entirely change the nation?s architecture by making zero in terms of not only 
tariﬀ but also finance, insurance, medical, and service. Yamada Masahiko, a former minister of Minis-
try of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), strongly opposed the TPP and regarded it as the 
?black ship (kurobune)? that would propel the complete collapse of Japanese agriculture.17
To cope with this anti-FTA movement, the DPJ launched the ?APEC, EPA and FTA Project Team 
(EPA PT)? as a project team about the FTA under the Policy Research Council and started to review 
arguments for and against the TPP. The majority of members were skeptical about the TPP.18 The chair, 
Sou Yamaguchi, presented the EPA PT?s understanding that it was diﬃcult to coordinate participation 
in the TPP because there were both supporters and skeptics in the party.19 Due to huge opposition 
against the TPP within the DPJ, Kan and his cabinet could not approve participation in the TPP in the 
Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnership on November 9, despite Kan?s own personal ef-
forts to promote the TPP. It was agreed that Japan would start consulting with TPP-participating na-
tions to gather information.20
Second, there was also the existence of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenkoku 
15 Interview with DPJ politician, PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012.
16 Chung-An Ilbo, October 15, 2011.
17 Newsweek, October 28, 2010.
18 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 29, 2010.
19 Bloomberg, October 28, 2010.
20 Prime Minister?s Oﬃce (2010), ?Basic Policy for Comprehensive Economic Partnership.?
21 Interview with DPJ politician/PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012
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Nōgyō-kyōdō-kumiai Chuōkai), in short, JA-Zenchu, which was opposed to the strengthening of ?in-
dividual income support allowance for farmers? (side payment).21 JA-Zenchu?s major activities include 
its role as a comprehensive advisory organization of agricultural administration as well as lobbying 
and appealing to government and parliament oﬃcials. For instance, in October 2011, JA-Zenchu sub-
mitted a request to the parliament opposing participation in TPP negotiations. A strong ?agricultural 
policy subgovernment? (Mulgan 2008, 172) led by JA-Zenchu, agricultural tribes (farm politicians in 
the ruling LDP), and MAFF bureaucrats, who shared strong common interests in promoting and pro-
tecting domestic agriculture, has played a primary role in establishing agricultural trade policy and 
hindered agricultural liberalization. Honma (2010) points out there had been close relationships be-
tween this ?agricultural policy triangle? (Yamashita 2009) and the LDP, making it possible to conduct 
pro-agricultural policy through party policy councils such as the LDP?s Agricultural Committee before 
the parliamentary negotiation process. It is significant that 80 percent of LDP politicians agreed to the 
anti-TPP parliamentary appeal. In other words, Japan?s trade policy making process was influenced by 
informal institutions involving various agricultural groups, including JA-Zenchu and politicians.
To sell future participation in the TPP, Kan had to weaken the opposition from the agricultural sec-
tor by establishing the Headquarters for the Revitalization for Japan?s Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries and started to review the two billion agricultural support measures based upon the strength-
ening of side payments, which had been at the center of DPJ?s agricultural policy.22 Side payments for 
farmers had been encouraged by the GATT system for developed countries to use as direct payment 
instead of a tariﬀ. The United States and EU have provided side payments to farmers, while in Japan 
JA-Zenchu hampered it because they could get an income commission, which is determined by 
price.23
JA-Zenchu launched a campaign against the TPP, asserting that the TPP would seriously damage not 
only agriculture but also the insurance sector, and recruited the Japan Medical Association to its side 
(Yamashita 2012, 184). For instance, JA-Zenchu held a massive demonstration by farmers against the 
TPP. It also collected 11 million signatures against the TPP,24 instead urging the government to protect 
their livelihoods.25 They also insisted that Japanese consumers would not be able to eat Japan?s safe ag-
ricultural products anymore and mobilized support from consumers.26 Furthermore, at the New 
Growth Strategy Conference held in October 2010, JA-Zenchu announced its strong opposition to Ja-
pan?s participation in the TPP, asserting that the TPP would not be able to match Japan?s standards for 
food security.27 In addition, it also provoked a TPP opposition movement, asserting that the TPP 
22 Sankei Shimbun, October 24, 2010.
23 Interview with DPJ politician/PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012.
24 Asahi Shimbun, October 24, 2011.
25 Yomiuri Shimbun, November 9, 2011.
26 Interview with DPJ politician/ PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012.
27 Regarding the JA-Zenchu?s principal idea, see the report of Headquarters for the Revitalization of Japan?s Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, August 2, 2011. Isshoni kangaemasenka TPP to nihon no nougyou kurasi: TPP nado ni kansuru JA 
guruupu no kihonnteki kangaekata.
?     ?201
Japan and the Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP)
would bring about clear damages to Japan?s agriculture sector, but the Japanese government?s aim in 
TPP participation is unclear (Okabe 2011). The DPJ EPA PT also highlights the fact that ?regarding 
TPP, a concrete and substantial merit is very vague? (DPJ 2011).
Ultimately, the opposition from agricultural interests such as JA-Zenchu and the agricultural groups 
in government makes it diﬃcult for the Japanese government to participate in the TPP.28 Because agri-
cultural groups have traditionally maintained strong policy channels within the governmental policy-
making process through the connection with Zoku-giin and MAFF, Japan?s participation in the TPP 
faces diﬃcult prospects.
5.?Conclusion
Internationally, the impact of Noda?s statement of de facto participation in the TPP was enormous. 
Mostly, it seems that Japanese government incorporates strategic calculations in pushing for the TPP, 
believing that it will be an eﬀective means to contain rising China. Apparently, the United States hopes 
that the TPP will help to counterbalance Chinese economic and political influence in the region, and 
regards Japan?s joining in the TPP is key to achieving its purpose. From the viewpoint of China, the 
TPP has become a US-driven initiative that would create an Asia-Pacific free trade zone but exclude 
China. China is suspicious of the TPP, regarding it as a form of US containment, especially when 
viewed in the context of the larger Asian ?pivot? (Auslin 2012, 30). For instance, according to Cai 
Penghong of the Shanhai Institute for International Studies, the Chinese have considered that the US? 
focus on the TPP could be interpreted as part of its regional repositioning strategy, which covers diplo-
matic and military deployments (Cai 2011).
Facing Japanese interest in joining the TPP, China, which had been focused on the ASEAN+3 
framework, softened its attitude flexibly toward Japan?s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partner-
ship (RCEP) proposal (Okabe 2012, 100). China wants Japan and South Korea to be the key members 
of an ASEAN+3 FTA. In the past, Japan showed a half-hearted attitude toward this initiative, clearly 
concerned about Chinese dominance, and has proposed to include India. Recently, as the opposite pull 
of the TPP, China seems to have complied with Indian participation. Specifically, it aﬀected the East 
Asian regional integration movement, which had been centered on ASEAN. For instance, in the infor-
mal ASEAN+6 conference 2011, China and Japan declared to establish a workshop for the liberaliza-
tion of trade, investment, and service regardless of their favored integration framework. Since it is dif-
ficult for both Japan and China to participate in the TPP under the current situation, they finally 
decided to proceed with the East Asian integration negotiation process despite their competitive strat-
egies thus far (Terada 2011, 103).
As Auslin (2012) said, the TPP should be used to balance, rather than to contain, China. Indeed, its 
strategic importance cannot be overlooked. China is already the largest trading partner to Japan, South 
28 Interview with DPJ politician/PT member, Tokyo, September 7, 2012.
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Korea, and ASEAN countries, and its economic influence will be more severe in the coming decades. It 
is important for Japan to balance China on the intra-Asian trade, because despite its weakness, Japan is 
the only Asian counterweight to China economically. This is not to mention that the US?Japan alliance 
is a stabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific region. In cooperation with the United States, Japan can lead 
the way in strategic trust among Asia-Pacific nations.
How, then, will the development of the TPP influence South Korea?s FTA policy as well as regional 
strategy? Since South Korea has already signed FTAs with seven countries and is negotiating with an-
other four among the TPP-participating countries, there is no immediate incentive to join the TPP. As 
with Japan, there is a concern that South Korea?s agriculture will also be seriously aﬀected by the TPP 
and, furthermore, most eﬀects of the FTAs that it has worked hard to conclude can be damaged severe-
ly. I argue, despite this, that South Korea may have to be prepared to join the TPP in the long term. 
Judging from the tendency of regional development, the Asia-Pacific economic integration is sure to 
be realized. Given that the Asia-Pacific is where the majority of the country?s economic activities take 
place, there is no reason it should not participate in possibly an entire regional FTA in the coming de-
cade. South Korea?s decision to join the TPP will depend on careful consideration of factors such as re-
gionalism regarding China and Japan, progress in the trilateral FTA negotiations, and participation by 
other countries in the Asia-Pacific.
The TPP would be an example of a bottom-up approach to achieving the APEC goal of an FTAAP. 
The growing number of FTAs, and now the TPP, would be a stepping-stone toward regional and global 
economic integration. Japan needs to link its economy firmly with the strong growth track of an 
emerging Asia and its rapidly growing middle class. It needs to promote greater economic links with 
the rest of Asia, including moves toward an East Asian FTA and support for the TPP given that it 
could eventually develop into an FTAAP. A wide FTA could bring substantial benefits to the Japanese 
economy. In that sense, it is essential to join high-level FTAs such as the TPP for restoration of the 
earthquake damage and recovery of Japan?s long-lasting economic recession.
It seems that the current LDP administration stopped clarifying its position on the pros and cons of 
Japan?s participation in the TPP. Rather, the LDP administration is apparently attempting to put more 
emphasis on diplomacy, security, and education?policy measures on which Abe places importance?
in an attempt to appeal to the Japanese public. It seems likely that LDP-led Japan will continue to face 
diﬃculties in participating in the TPP. If Abe does proceed with the TPP negotiation process, compen-
sation measures for noncompetitive sectors will be crucial. For example, strengthening side payments 
for farmers could lessen the opposition from agriculture. In addition, it is also important for sectors 
that benefit from Japan?s participation in the TPP to have a strong voice in the policymaking process. 
Furthermore, the LDP administration needs to persuade public opinion and to maintain a firm bed-
rock of stable government.
If the LDP administration joins the ongoing trade negotiations through the TPP, it can attempt to 
have its national interests reflected in the rules of the TPP and present these to the WTO. Hence, Japan 
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can incorporate its national interests into a set of global norms and rules as well. To this end, it is nec-
essary to join the TPP at an early stage in the negotiations. Even if Japan joins the TPP immediately 
before the participating countries reach an agreement, it will not be able to derive much benefit from 
the new trade agreement. An aging population and shrinking labor force will constrain its economic 
growth. For Japan, the key to long-term economic vitality is economic restructuring, including the ag-
ricultural sector since the ?lost decade? of the 1990s. From this point of view, the TPP is significant. 
But it is a long process.
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